Decomposition of Differential Games by Festa, Adriano & Vinter, Richard
Decomposition of Differential Games
Adriano Festa a Richard Vinter b
aENSTA ParisTech, 828, Boulevard des Marchaux, 91120 Palaiseau, FR
bImperial College, EEE Department, Exhibition Road, SW7 2BT London, UK
Abstract
This paper provides a decomposition technique for the purpose of simplifying the solution of certain zero-sum differential
games. The games considered terminate when the state reaches a target, which can be expressed as the union of a collection
of target subsets; the decomposition consists of replacing the original target by each of the target subsets. The value of the
original game is then obtained as the lower envelope of the values of the collection of games resulting from the decomposition,
which can be much easier to solve than the original game. Criteria are given for the validity of the decomposition. The paper
includes examples, illustrating the application of the technique to pursuit/evasion games, where the decomposition arises from
considering the interaction of individual pursuer/evader pairs.
Key words: Differential games, viscosity solutions, decomposition techniques.
1991 MSC: [2010] 49N70, 35D40, 49M27.
1 Introduction
We propose a decomposition technique to simplify the
solution of zero-sum differential games that involve two
players (the a-player and the b-player), whose actions
govern the evolution of the state x. The state trajectory
associated with open loop policies a(.) and b(.) (‘open
loop policies’ are defined below), for a specified initial
state x0, is given by the (absolutely continuous) solution
of the differential equation{
x˙(t) = f(x(t), a(t), b(t)), a.e.
x(0) = x0 .
Here, f(., ., .) : Rn × Rm1 × Rm2 → Rn is a given func-
tion. Open loop policies a(.) and b(.) of the two players
take values in specified sets A ⊂ Rm1 and B ⊂ Rm2 re-
spectively. We write the solution x(t;x0, a(.), b(.)). It is
assumed that hypotheses are imposed on the data en-
suring that a solution exists and it is unique. We also
specify a closed set T ⊂ Rn called the ‘target’. The first
entry time τ for x(t;x0, a(.), b(.)) is.
τ := sup{t |x(t;x0, a(.), b(.)) /∈ T } .
Email addresses: festa@ensta.fr (Adriano Festa),
r.vinter@imperial.ac.uk ( Richard Vinter).
Let A and B be the spaces of open loop policies for the
a-player and b-player respectively, namely
A := {a(.) : [0,∞)→ Rm1 | a(.) meas. and a(t) ∈ A a.e. },
B := {a(.) : [0,∞)→ Rm2 | b(.) meas. and b(t) ∈ B a.e. } .
For a(.) ∈ A and b(.) ∈ B the pay-off is
J(x0, a(.), b(.)) =∫ τ
0
e−λt l(x(t; 0, x0, a(.), b(.)), a(t), b(t))dt ,
in which λ ≥ 0 (the discount factor) is a given number
and l(., ., .) : Rn × Rm1 × Rm2 → R (the payoff inte-
grand) is a given function. Here, τ is the first entry time
for x(t;x0, a(.), b(.)).
Following Elliot-Kalton [6], we interpret ‘closed loop’
policies for the a-player and b-player respectively as
Φ := {φ : B → A |φ is non-anticipative},
Ψ := {ψ : A → B |ψ is non-anticipative} .
Here, ‘φ(.) is non-anticipative’ in the first relation means,
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‘for any t′ ≥ 0, and b1(.), b2(.) ∈ B,
b1(t) = b2(t) a.e. t ∈ [0, t′] =⇒
φ(b1(.))(t) = φ(b2(.))(t) for a.e. t ∈ [0, t′] .
‘ψ(.) is non-anticipative’ in the second defining relation
is analogously defined. Using these interpretations, we
define the upper and lower values u(x) and v(x) of the
game, for a given starting start x ∈ Rn, to be
u(x) = sup
φ∈Φ
inf
b∈B
J(x(.;x, φ(b(.)), , b(.)),
v(x) = inf
ψ∈Ψ
sup
a∈A
J(x(.;x, a(.), ψ(a(.))) .
Define the real valued functions F (., ., .) and G(., ., .),
with domains in Rn × R× Rn → R
F (x, u, p) = λu+ inf
a∈A
sup
b∈B
{p · (−f(x, a, b)− l(x, a, b))} ,
G(x, u, p) = λu+ sup
b∈B
inf
a∈A
{p · (−f(x, a, b)− l(x, a, b))}.
There is an extensive literature on precise conditions on
the data, target, etc., under which u(.) coincides with
v(.), when u(.) can be characterized as the unique con-
tinuous viscosity solution of the HJI (Hamilton Jacobi
Isaacs) equation:{
F (x, u,Du) = 0 for x ∈ Rn\T ,
u(x) = 0 for x ∈ T ,
(1)
and when maximizing closed loop policies for the a-
player can be obtained from knowledge of u(.). See [1],
[3], [12] for expository material on these topics, and [2]
for numerical aspects.
In this paper, attention focuses on the upper value func-
ton u(.) and the associated HJI equation (1). We con-
sider situations in which the target T can be repre-
sented as the union of a finite number of closed sets Tj ,
j = 1, . . . ,m:
T = ∪mj=1Tj .
Here, the b-player, responding to the closed loop policy of
the a-player, has a choice over which component Tj , j =
1, . . .m, to exit into, to minimize the payoff. Consider the
family of ‘reduced’ value functions uj(.), j = 1, . . . ,m,
that result when the target T is replaced by the subset
Ti.
Of interest are cases in which the value functions uj(.),
j = 1, . . . ,m, for the target subsets are easier to calculate
than the value function u(.) for the full target T and
when u(.) can constructed as the lower envelope of the
uj(.)’s, thus:
u(x) = min{uj(x) | j = 1, . . . ,m}. (2)
The motivation for seeking a decomposition of this na-
ture is as follows. Optimal control problems are special
cases of differential games in which the constraint set
A for the a-player is a single point; there is then only
one possible open loop policy for the a-player, which
can therefore be effectively ignored. For optimal control
problems, the decomposition (2) is always valid, since
replacing T by one particular Tj amounts to a strength-
ening of the problem constraints, and cannot therefore
reduce the value. So, for any x and any j, u(x) ≤ uj(x).
On the other hand, an optimal policy, for the given ini-
tial state x, must result in the state trajectory exiting
into Tk¯ for some k¯. But then u(x) ≥ uj(x). These in-
equalities validate the decomposition (2).
When the presence of the a-player is restored and we are
dealing with a true differential game, decomposition is a
much more complicated issue. There are nontheless in-
teresting cases when the decomposition can be achieved.
The goal of this paper is to give criteria for decomposi-
tion, and to illustrate their application.
We shall assume that the value functions involved are
unique viscosity solutions of the HJI equation with ap-
propriate boundary conditions. This means that check-
ing the validity of the decomposition reduces to answer-
ing the question: when is the lower envelope of a family
of viscosity solutions to a particular HJI equation also a
viscosity solution? In Section 2 we give two criteria ((E)
and (C)) under which the answer is affirmative. (E) is
more general, but (C) is often easier to verify. (C) is sat-
isfied, in particular, when F (x, u, .) is convex. This is a
well-known fact: the viscosity solution property is pre-
served under the operation of taking the lower envelopes,
for convex Hamiltonians. Notice that, for optimal con-
trol problems F (x, u, .) is always convex, so this fact is
consistent with the earlier observation that, for optimal
control problems, regarded as special cases of differen-
tial games, the decomposition is possible. However (C)
is weaker than ‘full’ convexity of F (x, u, .), because it
requires us to check, for each x ∈ Rn\T , the convexity
inequality only w.r.t. gradient vectors of the minimizing
uj(.)’s at x. In the examples, this (restricted sense) con-
vexity condition is satisfied while full convexity fails. We
provide examples from pursuit/evasion games in which
the decomposition simplifies computations by reducing
the state dimensionality.
Some examples of the decomposition, without detailed
accompanying analysis were presented in [7].
2 Properties of the Lower Envelope of a Family
of Viscosity Solutions
Take a function F (., ., .) : Rn×R×Rn → R and consider
the partial differential equation
F (x, u(x), Du(x)) = 0 . (3)
2
Definition 2.1 Take an open subset Ω ⊂ Rn and a func-
tion u(.) : Ω → R. Then u(.) is a continuous viscosity
subsolution of (3) on Ω if it is continuous and, for each
x ∈ Ω,
F (x, u(x), p) ≤ 0, ∀p ∈ D+u(x) . (4)
u(.) is a continuous viscosity supersolution of (3) on Ω
if it is continuous and, for each x ∈ Ω,
F (x, u(x), p) ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ D−u(x). (5)
u(.) is a continuous viscosity solution of (3) on Ω if it
is both a continuous subsolution and supersolution of (3)
on Ω.
Here, D+u(x) and D−u(x) denote, respectively, the
Fre´chet superdifferential and subdifferential of the con-
tinuous function u(.) defined on an open subset of Rn
containing the point x:
D+u(x) :={
p ∈ RN : lim sup
y→x
u(y)− u(x)− p · (y − x)
|x− y| ≤ 0
}
,
D−u(x) :={
p ∈ RN : lim inf
y→x
u(y)− u(x)− p · (y − x)
|x− y| ≥ 0
}
.
(For the analysis of this paper it is helpful to define con-
tinuous viscosity solutions in terms of one-sided Fre´chet
differentials which is equivalent to the standard defi-
nition in terms of gradients of smooth majorizing and
minoring functions [4].
The following proposition gives conditions under which
the lower envelope of a collection of continuous viscosity
solutions of (3) is also a continuous viscosity solution,
expressed in terms of the limiting superdifferential ∂L(x)
of the continuous function u(.) at x:
∂Lu(x) := {p | ∃ sequences pi → p and
xi → x s.t. pi ∈ D+u(xi) for each i} .
Proposition 2.2 Take a collection of closed sets Tj ⊂
Rn, j = 1, . . . ,m. For each j, let uj(.) be a scalar valued
function with domain Rn\Tj. Define
I(x) = {j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} |uj(x) = Min
j′
uj′(x)}
for each x ∈ Rn\(∪mj=1 Tj)
and
Σ = {x ∈ Rn\(∪mj=1 Tj) |Cardinality{I(x)} > 1} .
Take u¯(.) : Rn\(∪mj=1 Tj) → R to be the lower envelope
function
u¯(x) = Min
j
{uj(x)} .
(a): Suppose that uj(.) is a continuous viscosity supersolu-
tion of (3) on Rn\Tj for each j. Then u¯(.) is a contin-
uous viscosity supersolution of (3) on Rn\(∪mj=1 Tj).
(b): Suppose that uj(.) is a continuous viscosity subsolution
of (3) on Rn\Tj for each j, that H(., ., .) is continuous
and that, for each x ∈ Σ, uj(.) is Lipschitz continuous
on a neighbourhood of x.
Consider the hypotheses:
(C): for any x ∈ Σ, any set of vectors {pj | j ∈ I(x)} such
that pj ∈ ∂Luj(x) for each j ∈ I(x), and any convex
combination {λj | j ∈ I(x)},
F (x, u¯(x),
∑
j∈I(x)
λjpj) ≤
∑
j∈I(x)
λjF (x, uj(x), pj) .
(E): for any x ∈ Σ, any set of vectors {pj | j ∈ I(x)} such
that pj ∈ ∂Luj(x) for each j ∈ I(x), and any convex
combination {λj | j ∈ I(x)},
F (x, u¯(x),
∑
j∈I(x)
λjpj) ≤ 0 .
(i): (E) =⇒ ‘ u¯(.) is a continuous viscosity subso-
lution to (3) on Rn\(∪mj=1 Tj)’.
(ii): If, additionally, uj(.) is C
1 on a neighborhood of x
for each j, then
u¯(.) is a continuous viscosity subsolution to (3)
on Rn\(∪mj=1 Tj) =⇒ (E).
(iii): (C) =⇒ (E)´.
Comments.
(i): The proof of the proposition is based on a well-
known estimate for one-sided differentials to lower en-
velope functions, in terms of the one-sided differentials
to the constituent functions (the ‘Max Rule’). Such es-
timates are studied in depth in [13].
(ii): The proposition treats separately the preservation
of the supersolution and subsolution properties of vis-
cosity solutions under the operation of taking the lower
envelope, because much weaker hypotheses need be im-
posed in connection wth supersolutions.
(iii): We give two sufficient conditions for the lower en-
velope of a famility of continuous viscosity solutions also
to be a continuous viscosity solution, namely (E) and
(C). (C) is a more restrictive condition, but it is useful
because, as illustrated in the following examples, it can
be easier to verify.
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(iv): The proposition is an analytical tool for decompos-
ing a differential game (associated with the value func-
tion u¯(.)) into a collection of simpler problems. The crit-
ical hypothesis in this proposition is (E) (or (C)). (C)
is automatically satisfied when F (x, u, .) is convex. This
special case of the proposition is well-known [4]. How-
ever (C) imposes a convexity type condition onF (x, u, .),
only with respect to selected vectors in its domain. In
some cases, examples of which given below, the restricted
sense convexity hypothesis is satisfied but the full con-
vexity hypothesis is violated; the proposition thereby
identifies a new class of differential games for which the
decomposition is possible.
Proof of Prop. 2.2.
(a): Suppose that uj(.) is a continuous viscosity su-
persolution of (3) on Rn\Tj for each j. Take any
x ∈ Rn\(∪mj=1 Tj) and p ∈ D−u¯(x). Then
u¯(x′)− u¯(x) ≥ p · (x′ − x)− o(|x′ − x|) ,
for all x′ ∈ Rn\(∪mj=1 Tj). (Here, o(.) : R+ → R+ is
some function such that lims↓0 o(s)/s→ 0.) Choose any
j ∈ I(x). We know that uj(x) = u¯(x) and uj(x′) ≥ u¯(x′)
. It follows that, for all x′ ∈ Rn\(∪mj=1 Tj),
uj(x
′)− uj(x) ≥ p · (x′ − x)− o(|x′ − x|) .
But then p ∈ D−uj(x) and, since uj is a continuous
viscosity supersolution, we have F (x, uj(x), p) ≥ 0. It
follows that F (x, u¯(x), p) ≥ 0. Since u¯(.) is continuous,
we have established that u¯(.) is a continuous viscosity
subsolution of (3) on Rn\(∪mj=1 Tj).
(b)(i): Suppose that uj(.) is a continuous viscosity
subsolution of (3) on Rn\Tj for each j. Take any
x ∈ Rn\(∪mj=1 Tj) and p ∈ D+u¯(x). We must show that
F (x, u¯(x), p) ≤ 0 . (6)
Suppose first that x /∈ Σ, i.e. I(x) contains a single index
value j. Then, since the ui(.)’s are continuous, u¯(x
′) =
uj(x
′) for all x′ in some neighbourhood of x. It follows
that p ∈ D+uj and so F (x, uj(x), p)(= F (x, u¯(x), p)) ≤
0. We have confirmed (6) in this case.
It may be assumed then that x ∈ Σ. Now, uj(.) is
Lipschitz continuous on a neighbourhood of x for each
j ∈ I(x). Since p ∈ D+u¯(x), it is certainly the case that
p ∈ ∂Lu¯(x). Using the property that u¯(x′) coincides with
max{uj(x′) | j ∈ I(x′)} for x′ in some neighbourhood of
x, we deduce from the Max Rule for limiting subdiffer-
entials of Lipschitz continuous functions (see, e.g., [16,
Thm. 5.5.2]) applied to −u¯(.) the following representa-
tion for p:
p =
∑
j∈I(x)
λjpj ,
for some convex combination {λj | j ∈ I(x)} and vectors
pj ∈ ∂Luj(x), j ∈ I(x). But then, by hypothesis (E),
F (x, u¯(x), p) = F (x, u¯(x),
∑
j∈I(x)
λjpj) ≤ 0 .
We have confirmed (6) and so (b)(i) is true.
(b)(ii): Take any x ∈ Σ. Suppose that the uj ’s are con-
tinously differentiable of a neighbourhood of x and that
u¯(.) is a viscosity solution. Take any convex combination
{λi} on I(x). Then, for all x′ in some neighborhood of x,
u¯(x′)− u¯(x) ≤
∑
i∈I(x)
λi(ui(x
′)− ui(x))
≤
∑
i∈I(x)
λi∇ui(x) · (x′ − x) + o(|x′ − x|) .
This last inequality tells us that
∑
i∈I(x) λi∇ui(x) is a
limiting superdifferential of u¯(.) at x. But then, since
u¯(.) is a viscosity subsolution,
F (x, u¯(x),
∑
j∈I(x)
λjpj) ≤ 0 .
We have confirmed that (E) is true.
(b)(iii): Take any convex combination {λi} on I(x) and
vectors pi ∈ ∂Lui(x) for i ∈ I(x). It follows from the
definition of the limiting supergradient that, for each i,
there exist sequences xij → x and pij → pi such that pij ∈
D+ui(x
i
j) for i = 1, 2, . . . But then, for each i ∈ I(x),
F (xij , u
j(xij), p
i
j) ≤ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,
since the ui(.)’s are viscosity subsolutions. It follows that∑
j∈I(x) λjF (x
i
j , u
j(xij), p
i
j) ≤ 0, i = 1, 2, . . .. Noting
the continuity of F (., , ., ) and also the uj(.)’s, we may
pass to the limit as i→∞ to obtain∑
j∈I(x)
λjF (x, uj(x), pj) ≤ 0 .
Assume (C). Then
F (x, u¯(x),
∑
j∈I(x)
λjpj) ≤
∑
j∈I(x)
λjF (x, uj , pj) ≤ 0 ,
which is (E).
3 Pursuit Evasion Games
Pursuer/evader games are examples of the game posed
in the Introduction. There is an extensive literature on
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such games, going back to Rufus Isaacs’ work in the
1960’s, and his monograph [10] contains many examples.
Expository material is to be found in [8], [12]. We note
also [5], [11], [9], [11], [14], and [15]. But none of these
references systematically address decomposions of the
game, each element of which is generated by a target
subset. Pursuer/evader games is an application area for
the methods proposed in this paper; they provide exem-
plar problems, both where decomposion is possible, and
where it is not.
We consider zero sum differential games which terminate
when one of the pursuers is sufficently close to one of the
evaders, where ‘closeness’ is understood in the sense of a
specified target. The pay-off is the time until the target
is attained. We analyse a number of examples, involving
different numbers of pursuers and evaders, and different
targets.
The a-player is the collection of m1 evaders, labelled
1, . . . ,m1, and the b-player the collection ofm2 pursuers,
labelled m1 + 1, . . . ,m1 + m2. The states of individual
pursuers and evaders x1, . . . , xm1 and xm+1 . . . , xm1+m2
are governed by the equations
dx1
dt
= f1(x1, a1) , . . . ,
dxm1
dt
= fm1(xm1 , am1))
dxm1+1
dt
= fm1+1(xm1+1, b1), . . . ,
dxm1+m2
dt
= fm1+m2(xm1+m2 , bm2) .
The variables a1, . . . , am1 and b1, . . . , , bm2 are inter-
preted as controls for the evaders and the pursuers,
respectively, which are subject to the constraints
ai ∈ Ai, i = 1, . . . ,m1, and bi ∈ Bi, i = 1, . . . ,m2 .
Here, fi(., .) : Rn × Rri → Rn, i = 1, . . . ,m1 + m2
are given functions, and Ai ⊂ Rri , 1, . . . ,m1 and
Bi ⊂ Rri+m1 , 1, . . . ,m2, are given subsets.
We regard a1, . . . , am1 and b1, . . . , bm2 as block
components of a single evader control and pur-
suer control respectively. Take the state to be x =
col {x1 . . . , xm1+m2}. The open loop policy spaces for
evader and pursuer are
A := {meas. mappings ai : [0,∞)→ Rri , i = 1, . . . ,m1 |
ai(t) ∈ Ai a.e. for each i},
B := {meas. mappings bi : [0,∞)→ Rri+m1 , i = i, . . . ,m2 |
bi(t) ∈ Bi a.e. for each i} .
Write Φ for the space of non-anticipative mappings φ :
B → A. The game fits the formulation Section 1, with
λ = 0, and may be summarized as:
(P ′)

Maximize
φ∈Φ
Minimize
{bi}∈A
∫ τ
0
1 dt
x˙1(t) = f1(x1(t), a1(t))
...
x˙m1+m2(t) = fm1+m2(xm1+m2 , bm2), a.e.
(a1(t), ..., am1 , b1(t), ..., bm2(t))
∈ A1 × ...×Am1 ×B1 × ...×Bm2 , a.e.
in which (a1(.), . . . , am1(.)) = φ(b1(.), . . . , bm2(.))
and τ is first entry time into T
(x1(0), . . . , xm1+m2(0)) = (x¯1, . . . , x¯m1+m2)
for some given (x¯1, . . . , x¯m1+m2) ∈ Rn×. . .×Rn. Here T
is a given closed subset of Rn× . . .×Rn. The Hamilton-
Jacobi-Isaacs equation is
F (x1, . . . , xm1+m2 , Dx1u, . . . ,Dxm1+m2u) = 0 , (7)
in which
F (x1, . . . , xm1+m2 , p1, . . . , pm1+m2) =
−
m1∑
i=1
Hi(xi, pi) +
m1+m2∑
i=m1+1
Hi(xi,−pi)− 1.
Here Hi(xi, pi) :=
sup
ai∈Ai
pi · f(xi, ai) for i = 1, . . .m1
sup
bi−m1∈Bi−m1
pi · f(xi, bi−m1) for i = m1 + 1, . . .m1 +m2.
(8)
3.1 A Single Pursuer/Multiple Evaders Game
Consider first a case of the pursuit/evasion game, written
(P 1), in which m1 = m > 1, m2 = 1 and n = 1 (a
single pursuer/multiple evaders game in 1D space). The
states of the m evaders, labeled 1, . . . ,m and of the one
pursuer, labeledm+1, are interpreted as the positions of
the evaders and pursuer. The game terminates when the
pursuer is first at a distance r from one of the evaders,
where r ≥ 0 is a given constant. Accordingly, we take
T = T1 ∪ . . . ∪ Tm ,
in which, for i = 1, . . . ,m,
Ti := {(x1, . . . , xm+1) | |xm+1 − xi| ≤ r} .
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The Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation is
F 1(x1, . . . , xm+1, Dx1u, . . . ,Dxm+1u) = 0 , (9)
in which
F 1(x1, . . . , xm+1, p1, . . . , pm+1) =
−
m∑
i=1
Hi(xi, pi) + H
m+1(xm+1,−pm+1)− 1 ,
where
Hi(xi, pi) := sup
ai∈Ai
pi · f(xi, ai) i = 1, . . .m,
Hm+1(xm+1, pm+1) = sup
b1∈B1
pm+1 · f(xm+1, b1) .
(10)
Now take (P 1i ) to be the modification of (P
1), when Ti
replaces T , i = 1, . . . ,m. Let us assume that, for each i,
the value function ui(.) for (P
1
i ) is a continuous viscosity
solution of (7). The following proposition tells us that we
can construct a viscosity solution to (9) from the ui(.)’s,
by taking the pointwise infimum.
Proposition 3.1 For i = 1, . . .m, let ui(.) be the upper
value for (P 1i ). Assume
(a): For i = 1, . . .m, ui(.) is a continuous viscosity solution
of (7) on Rm+1\Ti.
(b): For any i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, i 6= j, and (x1, . . . , xm+1) ∈
Rm+1\T such that ui(x1, . . . , xm+1) = uj(x1, . . . , xm+1),
ui(.) and uj(.) are Lipschitz continuous on a neigh-
borhood of (x1, . . . , xm+1).
Then
u¯(x1, . . . , xm+1) :=
min{u1(x1, . . . xm), . . . , um+1(x1, . . . , xm+1)}
is a continuous viscosity solution of (7) on (R×. . .R)\T .
Comment. Suppose hypotheses are imposed, ensuring
that (1): for each i, the HJI equation for (P 1i ) has a
continuous viscosity solution on (Rn × . . .Rn)\Ti with
a continous extension to Ti, on which set the solution
vanishes, and (2): the value function (P 1) is the unique
continuous viscosity solution on (Rn × . . .Rn)\T that
has a continous extension to Ti, on which set the solu-
tion vanishes. The proposition tells us that, under these
circumstances, the upper value u(.) for (P 1) can be cal-
culated as the lower envelope of the continuous viscosiy
solutions for the (P 1i )’s. (Notice that, since all upper
values concerned are non-negative, and each ui(.) is as-
sumed to have a continuous extension to Ti, on which
set it vanishes, the lower envelope has a continuous ex-
tension to T , on which set it vanishes.)
Proof of Prop. 3.1. Note that, for any i, ui(x1, ..., xm+1)
depends only on the two variables (xi, xm+1). This is
because the first entry time into Ti only concerns the
state trajectories associated the i’th evader and the
pursuer (labelled m+ 1).
In view of the hypotheses imposed on the ui(.)’s, the
fact that u¯(.) is a viscosity solution of (7) will follow
from Prop. 2.2, if we can confirm hypothesis (C) of this
proposition. Take any z = (x1, . . . , xm+1) ∈ Rm+1\T ,
any index set I(z) (of cardinality l > 1) such that the
values ui(z), i ∈ I(z), coincide, and any convex combi-
nation {λi} from I(z). To simplify, assume index values
have been re-ordered so that I(z) = {1, . . . , , l}. Take
also p˜i ∈ Rn, i = 1, . . . , l such that
p˜i := (0, . . . , 0, pii, 0, . . . , 0, p
i
m+1) ∈ ∂Lui(z) . (11)
(The possibly non-zero components pii and p
i
m+1 of p˜
i
appear at the i’th and (m + 1)’th locations. We must
show η(λ1, . . . , λl) ≥ 0, where
η(λ1, . . . , λl) :=
l∑
i=1
λiF (z, p˜i)− F (z,
l∑
i=1
λip˜i) .
Noting the special structure (11) of the p˜i’s and the fact
that Hi(xi, pi) = 0 when p1 = 0, for each i, we see that
η(λ1, . . . , λl) =
l∑
i=1
λi
(
Hm+1(xm+1,−pim+1)−Hi(xi, pii)
)
−
(
Hm+1(xm+1,−
l∑
i=1
λip
i
m+1) −
l∑
i=1
Hi(xi, λip
i
i))
)
.
We achieve a further simplification from the fact that
Hi(xi, .) is positively homogeneous, soH
i(xi, λip
i
m+1) =
λiH
i(xi, p
i
m+1). This gives
η(λ1, . . . , λl) =
l∑
i=1
λiH
m+1(xm+1,−p1m+1)−Hm+1(xm+1,−
l∑
i=1
λi p
i
m+1) .
But then η(λ1, . . . , λl) is non-negative, because the term
Hm+1(xm+1, .), defined by (8), is convex. The proof is
complete.
3.2 A Multiple Pursuers/Single Evader Game
Consider next a case of the pursuit/evader game, writ-
ten (P 2), in which m1 = 1, m2 ≥ 1 and n = 2 (sin-
gle pursuer/multiple evaders). The dynamic behavior of
each player is modelled as a thrust acting on a mass,
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in 1D space, with saturating damping. The state equa-
tions, governing the position and velocity of each player,
are taken to be, for i = 2, . . . ,m+ 1,
 x˙11
x˙12
 =
 x12
−d1(xi2) + a1
 and
 x˙i1
x˙i2
 =
 xi2
−di(xi2) + bi−1
 .
Here, di(.) : R→ R, i = 1, . . . ,m+1 are given functions
satisfying
|di(y)− di(y′)| ≤ kd|y − y′|, di(y) ≤ cd, (12)
for all y, y′ ∈ R and i = 1, . . . ,m+ 1 for some constants
kd > 0 and cd > 0. The control actions the players are
required to satisfy
|a| ≤ α and |b| ≤ βi for i = 1, . . . .m . (13)
for positive constants α, β1, . . . , βm. We assume that
βi > α+ 2× cd for i=1,. . . , m. (14)
The game terminates when one of the pursuers overtakes
the evader. Thus, we take the target to be
T = T1 ∪ . . . ∪ Tm ,
in which, for i = 1, . . . ,m,
Ti := {(x1 = (x11, x12), . . . ,
xm+1 = (xm+11 , x
m+1
2 ) |xi1 ≥ x11} .
The HJI equation is
F 2(x1, . . . , xm+1, Dx1u, . . . ,Dxm+1u) = 0 , (15)
in which
F 2(x1, . . . , xm+1, p1, . . . , pm+1) =(
m+1∑
i=1
(−pi1xi2 − pi2d(xi2))
)
−α×|p12|+
m+1∑
i=2
(βi×|pi2|) .
Let (P 2i ) to be the modification of (P
2), when the target
Ti replaces T , i = 2, . . . ,m+ 1.
Proposition 3.2 Let ui(.) be the upper value for (P
2
i ),
for i = 2, . . .m+ 1. Assume
(a): For i = 2, . . .m + 1, ui(.) is a continuous viscosity
solution of (7) on (R2)m+1\Ti.
(b): For any i, j ∈ {2, . . . ,m+1}, i 6= j, and (x1, . . . , xm+1) ∈
(R2)m+1\T such that ui(x1, . . . , xm+1) = uj(x1, . . . , xm+1),
ui(.) and uj(.) are Lipschitz continuous on a neigh-
borhood of (x1, . . . , xm+1).
Then
u¯(x1, . . . , xm+1) :=
min{u1(x1, . . . xm+1), . . . , um+1(x1, . . . , xm+1)}
is a continuous viscosity solution of (15) on (R2)m+1\T .
Comment. When, for each i, the HJI equation for (P 2i )
has a continuous viscosity solution ui(.) on (R2)m+1\Ti
(with appropriate boundary values) and the value func-
tion u(.) for (P 2) is the unique continuous viscosity solu-
tion on (R2)m+1\T (with appropriate boundary values),
the proposition describes how the value function for (P 2)
can be obtained, as the pointwise infimum of the ui(.)’s.
Proof. Note that, for i = 2, . . . ,m+1, ui(x
1, . . . , xm+1)
depends only on the two variables (x1, xi), since the
first entry time into Ti only concerns the state trajec-
tories associated with the i’th pursuer and the evader.
We write ui(x
1, xi), suppressing irrelevant arguments in
the notation. Note that by assumptions (12) and (14)
(which tell us that all evaders can accelerate at a faster
rate than the evader), ui(x
1, xi) is finite when x11 ≥ xi1.
The left side of the HJI equation F 2 = 0 can be decom-
posed as
F 2 = F 21 + F 22 , (16)
whereF 21 andF 22, evaluated at ((x11, x
1
2), . . . , (x
m+1
1 , x
m+1
2 ),
(p11, p
1
2), . . . , (p
m+1
1 , p
m+1
2 )), are:
F 21 = −
m+1∑
i=1
(pi1x
i
2 − pi2d(xi2)) , (17)
and
F 22 = −α× |p12|+
m+1∑
i=2
βi × |pi2| . (18)
We shall make use of the following Lemma, whose proof
appears in the appendix.
Lemma 3.3 Let a¯(.) be the open loop strategy a¯(.) ≡
+1 for the evader, and let a(.) be any other open loop
strategy. Take initial states for the evader z = (z1, z2)
and z′ = (z
′
1, z
′
2) such that z
′
1 ≥ z1 and z
′
2 ≥ z2. Then
x11(t; a¯(.), z
′) ≥ x11(t; a(.), z) for all t ≥ 0 , (19)
where t→ (x11, x12)(t; a(.), z) is the state trajectory for the
evader, under the open loop strategy a(.) and for initial
state z.
Fix i, and consider (P 2i ). We deduce from the lemma that
the optimal closed loop strategy for the a-player (the
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evader) is φ¯(bi(.)) ≡ +1, for arbitrary initial state (x1 =
(x11, x
1
2), x
i
1 = (x
i
1, x
i
2)) such that x
1
1 > x
i
1. Furthermore,
if the a-player applies this optimal strategy then, for
any open loop strategy bi(.), the effect of increasing the
x12 component of the initial state is to increase the first
interception time. We conclude that
x12 → ui((x11, x12), (xi1, xi2)) is monotone increasing
(20)
for arbitrary ((x11, (x
i
1, x
i
2)) ∈ R3 such that x11 > xi1.
Once again, we shall deduce that the lower envelope u¯(.)
of the ui’s is a continuous viscosity solution (15) from
Prop. 2.2, by verifying hypothesis (C). Take any z =
(x1, . . . , xm+1) ∈ (R2× . . .R2)\T , any index set I(z) (of
cardinality l > 1) such that the values ui(z), i ∈ I(z)
coincide, and any convex combination {λi} from I(z).
We may assume that index values have been re-ordered
so that I(z) = {2, . . . , , l + 1}. For i = 2, . . . , l + 1, take
any p˜i ∈ Rn, such that
p˜i := ((pi,11 , p
i,1
2 ), (0, 0), . . . ,
(0, 0), (pi,11 , p
i,1
2 ), (0, 0), . . . (0, 0)) ∈ ∂Lui(z) . (21)
(We have used the fact that ui depends only on (x
1 =
(x11, x
1
2), x
i = (xi1, x
i
2)).) The possibly non-zero compo-
nents (pi,11 , p
i,1
2 ) and (p
i
1, p
i
2) of p˜
i appear at the first and
i’th locations. Note that, by (20),
pi,12 ≥ 0 for i = 2, . . . ,m+ 1 . (22)
Verification of hypothesis (C) requires us to show that
η(λ2, . . . , λl+1) ≥ 0, where
η(λ2, . . . , λl+1) :=
l+2∑
i=2
λiF
21(z, p˜i)− F 21(z,
l+2∑
i=2
λip˜i)
+
l+2∑
i=2
λiF
22(z, p˜i)− F 22(z,
l+2∑
i=2
λip˜i) .
Because F 21(z, .) is linear, we have
η(λ2, . . . , λl+1) :=
l+2∑
i=2
λiF
22(z, p˜i)− F 22(z,
l+2∑
i=2
λip˜i)
= c1 + c2 ,
where
c1 :=
l+1∑
i=2
(
−αλi|pi,12 |+ α|λip12|
)
and
c2 :=
l+1∑
i=2
λif
22(pi)− f22(z,
l+1∑
i=2
λip
i) ,
Fig. 1. Value function for a one-pursuer one-evader game
Fig. 2. Optimal trajectories of the agents in the first compo-
nent over time. X denote the point of capture
in which
f22(((p11, p
1
2), . . . , (p
m+1
1 , p
m+1
2 ) :=
m+1∑
i=2
βi × |pi2| .
But c1 = 0 since, by (22), the p
i,1
2 ’s all have the same sign.
Also, c2 ≥ 0, by convexity of f22(.). We have confirmed
η(λ2, . . . , λl+1) ≥ 0, and the proof of the proposition is
complete.
For the special case when m = 2, d(x) = x, α = 1 and
β1 = β2 = 0.5, (Figure 1) shows computations of the
value function with respect to the reduced coordinates
(y1, y2) = (x11 − x21, x12 − x22) in R2. Figure 2 shows an
example of the evolution of the positions of the players
over time, with respect to the original coordinates. Cap-
ture occurs at the point marked X, when pursuer P1
overtakes the evader, despite starting farther from the
evader than pursuer P2.
3.3 A Pursuit/Evasion Game With No Decomposition
We now provide a simple example illustrating that, for
a multiple pursuers/single evader game, with target a
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union of target subsets, each associated with the evader
and just one of the pursuers, may fail to have a de-
composition. In this example, it is possible to derive
formulae for the value functions involved, and to test
the conditions for decomposition directly.
We denote by (P 3) the special case of (P ) in whichm1 =
1, m2 = 2 and n = 1.
f1(x1, a) = a, f2(x2, b1) = b1 and f3(x3, b2) = b2 .
The controls actions of the players are constrained as
follows:
a ∈ A := [−α,+α],
b1 ∈ B1 := [−1,+1] and b2 ∈ B2 := [−1,+1],
for some α ∈ (0, 1). We take the target to be
T = T2 ∪ T3, where
T2 = {(x1, x2, x3) |x1 = x2}, T3 = {(x1, x2, x3) |x1 = x3} .
(In this version of the game, two pursuers chase a single
evader in 1D space. The game terminates when either
pursuer meets the evader.) Denote by (P 32 ) and (P
3
3 ) the
modified games in which the target T is replaced by the
subsets T2 and T3 respectively. The HJI equation is
F 3(Dx1u,Dx2u,Dx3u) = 0 , (23)
in which
F 3(p1, p2, p3) = |p2|+ |p3| − α|p1| − 1 .
Optimal strategies for both games (P 32 ) and (P
3
3 ) are:
the evader moves away from the pursuer, and the pur-
suer moves towards the evader, as quickly as possible.
A simple calculation based on these observations yields
upper values for (P 32 ) and (P
3
3 ), namely:
u2(x1, x2, x3) = (1− α)−1|x2 − x1| ,
u3(x1, x2, x3) = (1− α)−1|x3 − x1| ,
for all x = (x1, x2, x3) ∈ R3. Define u¯(.) : R3 → R to be
u¯(x) = min{u1(x), u2(x)} for x ∈ R3 .
Proposition 3.4 u¯(.) is not a continuous viscosity so-
lution for (23) on R3\T .
Since the upper value for (P 3) is a viscosity solution on
R3\T , vanishing on T , we may conclude that u¯(.) is not
the value function for (P 3).
Proof. Take any z > 0 and let x¯ = (0, z,−z). Then x¯ ∈
R3\(T2 ∪ T3). Also, u2(x¯) = u3(x¯), and u2(.) and u3(.)
are continuously differentiable at x¯. From the formulae
for the value functions we have
∇u2(z¯) = (−(1− α)−1, (1− α)−1, 0), and
∇u3(z¯) = ((1− α)−1, 0,−(1− α)−1) .
Then, for any λ ∈ (0, 1),
F 3(λ∇xu2(x¯) + (1− λ)∇xu3(x¯)) = λ
(1− β) +
1− λ
(1− β)
− β
(1− β) (−λ+ (1− λ))− 1 =
2λβ
(1− β) > 0 .
So condition (E) is violated. Then, u¯(.) cannot be a con-
tinous viscosity solution, by Prop 2.2, part (b)(iii).
The true value function u(.) for (P 3) is expressed in
terms of the subset:
D = {(x1, x2, x3) ∈ R3 | sgn{x2 − x1} = −sgn{x3 − x1}
and
1− α
1 + α
|x3 − x1| < |x2 − x1| < 1 + α
1− α |x3 − x1|} .
It is
u(x1, x2, x3) =

1
1−α min{|x2 − x1|, |x3 − x1|}
for (x1, x2, x3) ∈ R3\D
1
2 (|x2 − x1|+ |x3 − x1|)
for (x1, x2, x3) ∈ D .
We see that u(.) coincides with min{u1(x), u2(x)}, for
x ∈ R3\D. But
u(x) < min{u1(x), u2(x)}, for x ∈ D .
(The value function is constructed according to the
heuristic: each of the pursuers always travels at maxi-
mum speed towards the evader. if both pursuers are on
the same side of the evader, the evader travels at max-
imum speed in the opposite direction until the evader
is hit. If, on the other hand, the evader is between the
two pursuers, the evader travels at maximum speed
away from the closest pursuer until the two pursuers
are equidistant. The evader then stops until the evader
is reached. A check is then carried out that the value
function is a continuous viscosity solution of (7), has
a continuous extension to T on which it vanishes, and
which is therefore the upper value of the game.)
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Appendix: Proof of Lemma 3.3
Consider first the case z = z′. Fix t > 0. We examine the
optimal control problem of
Minimize −y1(t) subject to
(y˙1(s), y˙2(s)) = (y2(s),−d(y2(s)) + a(s)), a.e. s ∈ [0, t] ,
a(s) ∈ [−1,+1], a.e. s ∈ [0, t], (y1(0), y2(0)) = (z1, z2) .
(Notice that the controlled differential equation in this prob-
lem is that governing the motion of the evader.) The data
for the problem satisfy standard hypotheses for the exis-
tence of a minimizer a∗(.) on [0, t], with corresponding state
trajectory y∗(.) (see, e.g. [16, Chap. 2]). We can establish,
by means of a simple contradiction argument, that the non-
smooth Maximum Principle (see [16, Thm. 6.2.3]) applies
in normal form. We deduce the existence of a costate arc
p(.) = (p1(.), p2(.)) such that p1(.) ≡ +1, and p2(.) satisfies
the differential equation and right endpoint boundary con-
dition
−p˙2(s) = +p1(s)− ξ(s) p2(s) for s ∈ [0, t] and p2(t) = 0 .
Here, ξi(.) is a Lipschitz continuous function satisfying ξ(s) ∈
co ∂L d1(y
∗
2(s)) a.e. , in which ∂L d1 is the limiting subdiffer-
ential. The solution p2(.) is strictly positive on [0, t). From
the ‘maximization of the Hamiltonian’
a∗(s) = arg max {p2(s)a | a ∈ [−1,+1]} = +1 ,
a∗(.) = a¯(.) on [0, t]. We have shown that, for any t ≥ 0 and
initial condition z, a(.) = a¯(.) maximizes y1(t). This confirms
(19) when z′ = z.
We now show that (19) is true also when z
′
1 = z1 and z
′
2 > z
′
2.
In view of the preceding analysis, we can assume that a(.) =
a¯(.). Write (y1(.), y2(.)) and (y
′
1(.), y
′
2(.)) for the solutions to
the state equation, for initial states z = (z1, z2) and z
′ =
(z
′
1, z
′
2) respectively. Take any time t¯ > 0. By assumption
y˙
′
2(0) > y˙2(0). So there are two cases to consider
(a): y˙
′
2(t) > y˙2(t) for all t ≥ 0. In this case, since y
′
1(0) −
y1(0) > 0, we have, as required,
y
′
1(t¯)− y1(t¯) = (y
′
1(0)− y1(0)) +
∫ t¯
0
(y˙
′
2(t)− y˙2(t))dt > 0 .
(b) There exists t′ ∈ (0, t¯] such that y˙′2(t) > y˙2(t) for t ∈
[0, t′) and y˙
′
2(t
′) = y˙2(t′). In this case we show as, in the
previous case, that y
′
1(t
′) − y1(t′) > 0. We deduce from the
uniquess of solutions to the differential equation
y˙2(t) = d(y2) + 1 ,
on [t′, t¯], for fixed initial condition, that y
′
2(t) = y2(t) for
t ∈ [t′, t¯]. Hence, again, the required relation
y
′
1(t¯)− y1(t¯) = (y
′
1(t
′)− y1(t′)) +
∫ t¯
t′
(y˙
′
2(t)− y˙2(t))dt > 0 .
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